There are many studies focusing on VAT (value added tax) 
Introduction
The issue of base erosion and profi t shifting (BEPS) caused by multinational companies is a potential important impediment to tax collections. Because tax planning schemes utilized gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artifi cially shift profi ts to low or no-tax jurisdiction where there is insuffi cient of no economic activity (Hines, 2014; OECD, 2017) . The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has estimated the general annual revenue loss of USD 100 to 240 billion due to the BEPS OECD (2017) . Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) focused on tax motivated income shifting between parent companies and their affi liates. The parent companies have almost 60% affi liates established in low-tax jurisdictions. It resulted in profi t shifting from the high-tax parent companies' jurisdictions to the low-tax affi liates' jurisdictions where the profi t is taxed with the lower tax rate. Companies may also benefi t from the difference between the statutory and the marginal tax rates that jurisdictions offer. This fact has important role in profi t shifting across jurisdictional boundaries (Zodrow, 2010; Lennard, 2016; Baumann, Buchwald, Friehe, Hottenrott, & Weche, 2017) . There are many authors who deal with the issue that multinational companies shift their profi ts thanks to tax differentials through the use of transfer pricing mechanism, royalties, inter-company transactions, etc. (Altshuler & Grubert, 2006; 2002; Hines, 1999; Desai, Foley, & Hines, 2004; .This is not the only purpose of preferential tax jurisdiction. Companies also invest in tax havens because of the secrecy these jurisdictions offer (Braun & Weichenrieder, 2015) . The number of Czech companies, whose owners are established in tax havens, have decreased approximately by 43% after conclusion of instruments for exchange of tax information with these jurisdictions. This indicates the importance of anonymity. On the other hand, companies that remain in the jurisdictions after conclusion of such instruments increase investments due to better tax conditions (Rohan & Moravec, 2017) .
Currently, there are four studies made by international organizations that are focused on the estimation of the international corporate tax avoidance caused by base erosion and profi t shifting: International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2014), OECD (2015) , United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2015) , European Parliament Research Service (EPRS) (2015) . There are also other authors who deal with the corporate income tax gap (e.g. Cobham & Jansky, 2017; Davies et al., 2015; Gumpert, Hines, & Schnitzer, 2016; Riedel, Zinn, & Hofmann, 2015; Crivelli, de Mooij & Keen, 2016) . Jansky (2016) and Jansky and Kokes (2016) defi ne the tax gap as the difference between the real amount of tax legally due and the amount that taxpayers actually pay. This paper focuses on the calculation of corporate income tax effi ciency indicator and its comparison with other EU member states. Furthermore, the paper is aimed at the estimative amount of corporate income tax revenue that the Czech Republic might have lost as a result of international corporate tax avoidance in 2013, 2014 and 2015 and subsequently this paper shows variety and differences among different studies as the presented estimation is made with offi cial data obtained from General Financial Directorate instead from Eurostat and there the main reason for different results can be seen. The estimation combines the European Parliament Research Service's (2015) methodology and the IMF (2014) approach.
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Materials and Methods
The corporate tax gap revenue estimation uses IMF (2014) and EPRS (2015) methodology. The methodology has been chosen for comparison's purposes. EPRS (2015) research uses Eurostat data compared to this paper, which uses offi cial data from General Financial Directorate. Moreover the used methodology seems to be more precise in comparison with the methodology used for example by Glopolis (2016) . This methodology estimates the tax gap's impact through indicators mentioned below. The other methodology calculates the impact from total amount of EU corporate tax gap through ration of particular member states' contributions to EU Gross Domestic Product. The methodology calculates the corporate income tax effi ciency weighted average for all 28 European Union (EU) member states (MS) and net operating surplus adjusted for imputed compensation of self-employed as a theoretical corporate income tax base. These indicators are necessary for subsequent calculation of the revenue without profi t shifting. Ebrill and others (2001) 
Corporate Income Tax Effi ciency
To begin with, an indicator of corporate income tax effi ciency has been constructed. The indicator comes from IMF's report on spillovers:
(1)
The corporate income tax effi ciency for country i is denoted by Eff i . This indicator is calculated for particular EU member states. This step is required for second equation. Rev i represents actual corporate income tax revenue of country i in a local currency. The data of corporate income tax revenue for the Czech Republic comes from General Financial Directorate. For the rest of EU MSs, it comes from public fi nance and national accounts data from Eurostat. Rate i represents the statutory corporate income tax rate that is applied in the state i. The percentage tax rate is divided by 100. The data source of corporate income tax rate is used from European Commission's publications on taxation trends in the EU. Base i denotes the theoretical tax base of country i. There are available three types of operating surplus, which could be used as the theoretical tax base. Gross operating surplus, net operating surplus not adjusted for imputed compensation for self-employed workers, who are being treated for tax purposes as being external contractors and there are are not subject of income taxes from employment, pension etc. and the last one net operating surplus adjusted for imputed compensation for self-employed workers. The paper deals with the taxes on the corporate income excluding income of self-employed persons, whose surplus above their costs is taxed as personal income than corporate profi t. Therefore the theoretical tax base is expressed by the net operating surplus adjusted for imputed compensation for selfemployed workers. AMECO is used as the data source of the theoretical tax base. According to the EPRS's study, if the Eff i takes the value further below one, the corporate income tax system is the less effi cient in acquiring revenue. This may indicate tax competition (e.g. tax 1, XXII, 2019
Finance incentives) but also the profi t shifting. The difference between the corporate tax revenue data sources can be seen below. EPRS uses Eurostat database for its calculation. In this research the offi cial data from Czech General Financial Directorate has been used.
Hereinafter the calculation of the corporate income tax effi ciency for particular EU member states for time period 2013 is described. The effi ciency is needed for the subsequent indicator of revenue without profi t shifting estimation. Moreover the results confi rm possible differences of research outputs due to the different data sets.
Tab. 2 contains the calculation of the corporate income tax effi ciency for particular EU member states for time period 2014.
Tab. 3 below deals with the calculation of the corporate income tax effi ciency for particular EU member states for time period 2015.
Indicator of Revenue without Profi t Shifting
The second indicator gives an overview of how much the Czech Republic loses/gains from profi t shifting. The indicator represents a hypothetical value of tax revenues that the jurisdiction could have received in case there is not any profi t shifting applied:
The tax revenue without profi t shifting is denoted by RWS i . Rate i represents the statutory corporate income tax rate that is applied in the state i. The percentage tax rate is divided by 100. The data source of corporate income tax rate is used from European Commission's publications on taxation trends in the EU. Base i denotes the theoretical tax base of country i. The theoretical tax base is expressed by the net operating surplus adjusted for imputed compensation for self-employed workers. AMECO is used as the data source of the theoretical tax base. Eff i is the weighted average of corporate income tax effi ciency rate for the entire EU. This variable enables to exclude base effects except profi t shifting.
The fi nal effect is given by the difference between revenue without profi t shifting (RWS i ) and the actual corporate income tax revenue denoted by Rev i . The difference can be interpreted as the loss or gain from profi t shifting. In the case the actual corporate income tax revenue takes a higher value than the revenue without profi t shifting indicator then the jurisdiction profi ts from the profi t shifting. The opposite situation results in tax revenue losses caused by profi t shifting. 
Results
The EU member states corporate income tax effi ciency for the periods 2013-2015 calculated by the fi rst equation can be seen in Fig. 2 . The Czech Republic's corporate income tax effi ciency rate is approximately 70%, which is a very good result in comparison with Germany and Poland that have between 2013-2015, approximately 35%. This low number for Germany and Poland could be caused by base erosion and profi t shifting.
The corporate income tax effi ciency of the particular EU member state is used for the calculation of the weighted average of corporate income tax effi ciency rate.
In 2013 the Czech Republic's income tax effi ciency rate is approximately 74%, in 2014 it is approximately 68% and in 2015 it is approximately 72%. The Czech Republic is approaching the EU averagein mentioned period, but does not reach it. Therefore, the null hypothesis H 02 is accepted.
With the EU average effi ciency, the RWS calculation can be made. Based on the second equation the following results have been calculated (see Tab. 4).
If there was not be a base erosion and profi t shifting among the EU member states, the Czech Republic could have the amounts mentioned above as a corporate tax revenue. This hypothetical indicator is compared to the actual amount of corporate tax revenue. The difference can be interpreted as the loss or gain from profi t shifting. For a better overview of the results, see Tab. 5.
As shown in Tab. 5 it is evident that the theoretical corporate tax revenue, which represents revenue without profi t shifting (RWS), takes higher value than the actual corporate tax revenue (Rev). It resulted in loss of corporate tax revenue caused by profi t shifting. In 2013, the Czech Republic lost CZK 9,404 mil. due to the base erosion and profi t shifting. In 2014 the Czech Republic had its Fig. 4 it was confi rmed that the base erosion and profi t shifting cause corporate tax revenue loss in the Czech Republic in the observed period. Also it was confi rmed that different data sources may infl uence fi nal results signifi cantly.
Discussion
At the very beginning, it is very important to focus on the corporate income tax effi ciency rate which is depicted by Figs. 2 and 3 . Between 2013 and 2015 the Czech Republic is approaching the EU average. Germany and Poland have one of the lowest effi ciency rate, which may be caused by base erosion and profi t shifting. Corporate tax gap estimation studies concerning the Czech Republic have a very broad range related to the estimated amount. The estimated amount is located between CZK 57 billion loss and CZK 12.5 billion gain. Author shave observed that the corporate tax revenue loss is approximately CZK 9.404 billion in 2013. These fi ndings are close to UNCTAD (2015) extrapolation for the Czech Republic whose estimation is also CZK 12 billion. IMF (2014) extrapolation estimates the corporate tax gap of 8 billion CZK. Jansky and Cobham (2017) estimate on the IMF (2015) basis, approximately CZK 7 billion. It is the similar methodology that has been used in this paper. The result depends on the input database. For instance, the difference that is shown in the Fig. 1 . EPRS (2015) uses for its estimation Eurostat as a database of actual corporate tax revenue. EPRS (2015) study resulted in CZK 12.5 billion gain of corporate tax revenue for the Czech Republic in 2013 due to the profi t shifting. On the other hand, authors have changed the Eurostat database to the There can be another approach. Rohan and Moravec (2017) dealt with the tax information exchange impact on the number of companies relocated and on the amount of foreign direct investments shifted. The profi t shifting or the tax avoidance is being widely infl uenced by agreed instruments on exchange of information. There can be two kinds of taxpayers' reactions.
The fi rst reaction confi rms that some companies are interested in anonymity. Rohan and Moravec's (2017) study indicates taxpayers' companies relocation from jurisdictions that are covered by measures of information exchange to the jurisdictions that are not covered by the mechanism of information exchange. These shifted taxpayers may prefer anonymity to tax benefi ts as they do carry out direct investments into the non-contractual jurisdictions to keep the anonymity and they decided to bear the vindicatory 35% withholding tax, applied in the Czech Republic for example (see Section 36 subsection 1 letter c) of the Act No. 586/1992 Coll., as amended).
The second detected reaction of taxpayers shows, on the other side, an increase of foreign direct investments at the same moment, the agreements on exchange of information are concluded (or similar measures) with the preferential tax jurisdiction. As when such instruments are concluded the taxation of transactions is targeted by a specifi c provision and the tax is withheld at the level of 15% only. The Rohan and Moravec's study (2017) results show that Czech multinational companies, remaining in preferential tax jurisdictions since the anonymity was cancelled, increased the amount of their foreign direct investments, i.e. the remaining companies' owners prefer favorable tax regime instead of anonymity and use the new tax benefi t while increasing the amount of direct investments.
The amount of estimated losses due to the tax haven might be considered politically motivated as well (Široký, 2005) . The understanding of the offshore issue importance is highly individual from different points of view of different states (Kristofi k, Istok, & Nedelova, 2017) . For Germany and Poland the base erosion and profi t shifting is a huge problem (e.g. Meyering & Groene, 2017; Maurer, Port, Roth, & Walker, 2017; Stolicna & Cernicka, 2017) . However, the Czech Republic is one of the countries being relatively successful in corporate tax collection compared to most countries based on the current study results. Nevertheless, the Czech Republic must follow the OECD and EU and meet the requirements relating to the offshore industry elimination and apply the instruments increasing the intensity of tax information exchange to prevent the base erosion and profi t shifting among states, even though the Czech Republic is particularly as a state facing the relatively high VAT gap (CASE, 2015) the issue which infl uenced the state budget income and seems to be an issue of higher importance from the point of view of the Czech Republic tax administration. The countries with higher political power are more or less the states facing the higher amount of losses due to the base erosion and profi t shifting comparing to the countries keeping lower political power as the Czech Republic, which faces the problem of VAT gap particularly, as the studies showed. Such situation results in implementation of huge amount of instruments fi ghting the tax competition with relatively questionable benefi ts for some states as the Czech Republic.
Conclusion
This paper identifi es the signifi cant effect of base erosion and profi t shifting. The research estimates the corporate tax revenue loss in 2013, 2014 and 2015. In 2013, the corporate tax revenue loss was CZK 9,404 mil. In 2014, the corporate tax revenue loss was CZK 13,081 mil., which was the highest amount in the examined period. Therefore, the null hypothesis H 01 was rejected. Studies dealing with a similar issue have different results. For instace, EPRS 2019, XXII, 1 Finance (2015) study resulted in CZK 12.5 billion gain of corporate tax revenue for the Czech Republic in 2013 due to the profi t shifting. There is approximately CZK 22 billion difference. According to Glopolis (2016) study, the Czech Republic can lose up to CZK 57 billion corporate tax revenue caused by profi t shifting. Glopolis used different methodology, which uses ration of the Czech Republic's contributions to EU Gross Domestic Product, compared to this paper. The results' difference could have been caused by the used methodology or different data source.
The authors are convinced that if offi cial data of a particular EU member state instead of the Eurostat database (see the difference in Fig. 1) 
